The claimant, a solicitor, was the director and employee of the respondent company.   The issue arising was that he accepted a payment of £150 from the father of a legally aided client.  This was contrary to the respondent’s contract with legal aid which prohibited ‘topping up’.  The respondent company wrote to the claimant outlining that the central allegation was that his acceptance of the payment led to a breach of the respondent’s legal aid contract.  Following an investigation and disciplinary hearing, the respondent’s director found that the allegations had been proven and the claimant was summarily dismissed for gross misconduct. The claimant challenged this decision arguing he had been unfairly dismissed.

At first instance, the ET dismissed the unfair dismissal claim citing that the decision of the respondent to dismiss was within the bands of reasonableness. The claimant appealed to the EAT which had allowed the appeal and remitted the claim for rehearing.  The basis of allowing the appeal was that the EAT found that ET Judge had engaged in their own analysis of the evidence rather than examining it from the perspective of the reasonable employer. Furthermore, the EAT found that the Judge made no specific findings relating to the directors’ reasons in determining that the allegation had been proven against the claimant. The respondents appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal.  On the matter of the ‘reasonableness’ of the decision-maker it was found that the law had been outlined correctly as had the issues to be explored.   There was nothing, according to the Court of Appeal, in the language used by the ET Judge to suggest that they were answering a hypothetical or separate question to the one posed in the issues.  This was clear considering that in coming to a conclusion she had used the company’s conclusions rather than imposing any of her own.  The CA did find that the Judge had referred to mattes which were not part of the allegation letters or explored in the disciplinary process but it was found that they went to whether the conclusion drawn by the director of the respondent was reasonable rather than the Judge making her own decision on the matter.

On the second issue of the specific findings from the Judge, the CA found that the EAT made the wrong assumption in stating that if the Judge had not set out findings as to the director’s reasoning process that there must have been no evidence before her of it.  It is not incumbent upon the Tribunal to set out every fine detail of the evidence put before it.   There was no suggestion that the Judge’s reasons were not ‘Meek compliant’ (i.e. provide adequate information) which is the proper basis for challenge.   The fact that there was reference to the notes from the disciplinary meeting as well as the outcome letter which did outline the reasons was sufficient.  Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Practical Lessons

The Court of Appeal has provided good guidance as to what is expected from the Tribunal in making a decision.  There has been an appetite for appeals (in England and Wales) when the Tribunal decision does not expressly outline some of the fine details.  To some extent, these appeals have been upheld and others dismissed. By outlining that every fine detail is not required, and that Meek is the basis for challenges on the reasoning used by the Tribunal this provides an element of clarity.  Hopefully this will be taken on board rather than having more appeals based upon issues with the ‘fine detail’ in the judgment which does not go to the substance of the decision made.
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2021/672.html